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ABSTRACT
Although the concepts of relational and contractual governance in inter-organizational relationships
have attracted academic and practitioner interest over the last decades, to date there have been lim-
ited comprehensive and systematic efforts to review, analyse and synthesise extant literature. We
review and analyse 1,415 publications identified from a wide range of management disciplines and
journals from 1990 to 2018. We deploy bibliographic and content analyses to offer a comprehensive
literature analyses and synthesis and subsequently develop and position a multidimensional frame-
work of exchange governance. The proposed framework covers existing conceptualisations of
exchange governance and its diverse mechanisms, environmental dimensions influencing the use of
exchange governance mechanisms and performance implications. We uncover areas that are currently
under-studied and draw out fruitful future research avenues.
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1. Introduction
The development and management of inter-organizational
relationships (IORs) has been extensively researched within
organization and management studies (Das and Teng 1998;
Vanneste and Puranam 2010). Organizations forming these
relationships could be public, private, industrial, for-profit or
non-for profit in nature. IORs are observable at several levels
such as dyadic to ‘multiplicitous’, consisting of networks of
many organizations (Cropper et al. 2008). The study of IORs
focuses on the characteristics and patterns, origins, rationales
and consequences of such relationships (Cropper et al. 2008).
Inter-organizational governance mechanisms refer to the
formal and informal rules of exchange between partners
(North 1990; Vandaele et al. 2007). The deployment of these
governance mechanisms to nurture and manage IORs is an
important phenomenon in the sense that it affects not only
the performance of focal firms but also that of their suppli-
ers, customers and business partners (e.g. Carson, Madhok,
and Wu 2006; Klein-Woolthuis, Hillebrand, and Nooteboom
2005). Therefore, IOR governance mechanisms are especially
important to operations and supply management (OSM)
research (e.g. Cao and Lumineau 2015; Hartmann et al.
2014). Prior literature has distinguished between two main
types of governance mechanisms in IORs: contractual and
relational governance mechanisms (Griffith and Myers 2005;
Rousseau et al. 1998). Contractual governance is manifested
in ‘explicit, formal, and usually written contracts’ (Vandaele
et al. 2007, p. 240) that are mostly very detailed and legally
binding agreements, and which specify roles and obligations
of contracting parties (Lyons and Mehta 1997). Relational
governance refers to more emergent governance mecha-
nisms that are manifested in socially derived ‘arrangements’
and that are more informal in comparison to contractual
governance (Vandaele et al. 2007).
Advances in how inter-organizational governance is con-
ceptualised and operationalised are reflected in the growing
number of academic literature published on the topic (e.g.
Poppo and Zenger 2002; Lumineau 2017; Zheng, Roehrich,
and Lewis 2008). Although such literature provides important
insights, it also suffers from: (i) a fragmentation among sev-
eral research streams from economics, organization studies,
strategic management, law, and operations management
spanning different levels of analysis (see Schepker et al.
2014); (ii) a lack of conceptual clarity of the notion and inter-
play (i.e. substitute vs. complementarity discussions) of inter-
organizational governance mechanisms, antecedents that
influence the type of governance mechanisms used and sub-
sequent impact on relationship performance (see Cao and
Lumineau 2015), and (iii) limited effort to synthesize prior
research by cutting across disciplines and various key
themes. Moreover, prior studies have mainly focused on gov-
ernance mechanisms in horizontal relationships such as alli-
ances and further attention is needed to explore exchange
governance in, for instance, buyer-supplier relationships
(Lumineau 2017; Roehrich and Lewis, 2014; Schilke and
Lumineau 2018). We reason that prior studies’ more context-
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specific treatment inhibits integration and holistic evaluation
of the exchange governance literature. For instance, despite
offering valuable insights, Vandaele et al. (2007) focus mainly
on business services exchanges. Similarly, the study by Cao
and Lumineau (2015) offers insights via a meta-analysis of
IORs but does not deploy a comprehensive literature
review spanning academic disciplines and industry contexts
to take stock of and synthesise the body of knowledge
(Tavares Thome, Scavarda, and Scavarda 2016).
This study complements extant research efforts in analy-
sing and synthesising prior governance studies and positions
a research agenda and framework for future research ave-
nues, posing the following research questions: (i) What is the
current state of inter-organizational governance in manage-
ment research? and (ii) What are the emerging themes of inter-
est for management research? Such a comprehensive review
is highly relevant in order to advance our understanding of
governance mechanisms as well as how they have been con-
ceptualised and approached, both theoretically and empiric-
ally, across disciplines. Our research demonstrates a surge of
interest in governance literature over more than two deca-
des, with the vast majority (over 80%) of peer-reviewed jour-
nal papers published over the last decade (see Figure 1). The
recent exponential growth in the literature suggests that the
time is ripe to take stock of where inter-organizational gov-
ernance efforts are.
Our study draws together analyses of 1,415 published
governance articles, offering a comprehensive review of key
research streams in extant governance mechanisms studies.
Moreover, we provide a better understanding of how con-
tractual and relational governance mechanisms have been
defined and conceptualised. Second, we position a concep-
tual framework synthesising multiple theoretical perspectives
and associated constructs in terms of governance determi-
nants, mechanisms and performance outcomes. The devel-
oped framework contributes to existing research by serving
as a conceptual map of the field. It provides input for evalu-
ating where the literature currently is and pointing out
promising avenues for future research.
The paper is structured as follows. It commences by out-
lining the comprehensive review method adopted. The art-
icle is then split into two parts. Part one maps the field and
uses bibliographic and content analyses to offer a range of
analyses and examine changes in exchange governance
research. Part two offers a synthesis and comprehensive ana-
lysis of the emerging themes, linking exchange governance
mechanisms, antecedents and performance implications. This
section also draws out theoretical gaps and positions a
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Figure 1. Growth of articles on inter-organizational governance in management journals.
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multi-dimensional framework to bring together dispersed
research on exchange governance. Using this framework, cur-
rent literature limitations are pointed out and future research
avenues are discussed.
2. Comprehensive review approach
With the increasing attention towards studying contractual and
relational governance mechanisms in management studies and
indeed in OSM, we offer a comprehensive literature analysis
and synthesis of prior research on governance mechanisms
(Lumineau 2017; Roehrich and Lewis 2014). Literature reviews
are vital in establishing key themes and relationships amongst
the concepts under study, thus driving more structured future
research efforts (Burgess, Singh, and Koroglu 2006). Our search
strategy aimed at mitigating bias and establishing a compre-
hensive search and analysis framework by incorporating data-
base search, cross-referencing between authors and applying
agreed on inclusion and exclusion criteria (Durach, Kembro,
and Wieland 2017; Rashman, Withers, and Hartley 2009). We
adopted an iterative review procedure (Figure 2), commencing
with an initial scoping study to set the boundaries for our
study (Tavares Thome, Scavarda, and Scavarda 2016) and iden-
tifying seminal exchange governance papers (Heide and John
1992; Poppo and Zenger 2002). This initial analysis helped to
establish a focus for subsequent analysis stages by, for
instance, specifying the search period and terms. In addition,
seven scholarly subject experts were interviewed to further
improve the search strategy and search terms.
To identify articles for this review study, the main data-
base ISI Web of Knowledge was searched using terms such
as relational governance, contractual governance, relation-
ship governance mechanism, governance interplay, inter-
organiation trust contract, inter-personal trust contract,
inter-organi?ation contract*, contract network, inter-organ-
i?ation trust and trust governance. While ISI Web of
Knowledge is considered the most comprehensive database
for scholarly work, we also consulted other databases, such
as Emerald, Business Source Premier, Science Direct and
Ingenta to achieve even better coverage of journals.
Figure 2 outlines the approach used to identify articles
published during the period 1990–2018. While only a rela-
tively small number of papers was published before 1990,
recent years show an immense increase of interest in manage-
ment research on exchange governance (e.g. Klein-Woolthuis,
Hillebrand, and Nooteboom 2005; Kreye, Roehrich, and Lewis
2015; Lumineau 2017; Poppo and Zenger 2002). As such,
papers published between 1990 and 2018 offered a sufficient
timespan to enable a comprehensive and meaningful analysis.
In order to obtain a more comprehensive overview of extant
governance research, we searched for management journals
across areas including, but not limited to, marketing, strategy,
organization studies, international business as well as OSM.
We intentionally used broad search definitions as the concept
of inter-organizational governance is used and published in a
broad range of journals. Three researchers independently
judged the identified set of papers based on inclusion criteria,
being that identified papers should be from scholarly, peer-
reviewed publications and of conceptual and/or empirical
nature. For the selection of articles into the final dataset, the
researchers aimed for 100% agreement. When this level of
agreement was not reached during the initial reading of
abstracts, all researchers read and discussed papers in detail
and made a joint decision on the inclusion/exclusion of the
article into the final dataset.
The search led to the identification of 1,415 publications
forming the dataset. This dataset included OSM articles. We
specifically zoomed in on OSM articles with an aim to detect
publication patterns. This exercise did not lead to drastically
diverging results and we decided to present publication pat-
terns for the whole dataset. In order to produce new
insights, data analysis and synthesis can be seen as primary
value-added results of this comprehensive literature review
(Crossan and Apaydin 2010). Analysis and synthesis of identi-
fied papers consist of two parts: (i) examining patterns of
publications over the analysed period and (ii) presenting
fruitful future research avenues drawn from the identification
of thematic management research issues.
3. Part I: publication patterns
This section critically reflects on the analyses of the identified
dataset. It offers key observations that are worth highlighting
at this stage before moving on to discuss emerging research
themes. Figure 3(a–c) summarises the key disciplines, levels of
Scoping study                            
(informed by subject experts) 
Select literature sources 
1. Bibliographical databases search (e.g. 
Thomson’s ISI Web of Knowledge) 
2. Key journal search 
3.  Manual search and citaon tracking 
Final dataset of management journals: 
1,415 papers (including OSM papers) 
following detailed in-/exclusion criteria 
Analysis part: Reading abstract/full 
papers  
Synthesis and reporng  
Figure 2. Summary of comprehensive review process (adapted from Rashman,
Withers, and Hartley 2009, p. 5).
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analysis, methodological approaches and theoretical perspec-
tives adopted to date. Inter-organizational governance has
been subject to scrutiny by researchers from diverse back-
grounds, thus reflecting the inter-disciplinary nature of the
phenomenon which presents overlapping economic, social,
legal and political implications (North 1990).
Our review revealed that very few studies (<2%, see
Figure 3(a)) have focused on network governance. Therefore,
for the purposes of conducting the review, we restricted our
analysis to the dyadic level of analysis. A reason for the
dyadic focus currently dominating in inter-organizational
governance research (78%) might be the fact that research-
ers often face challenges in conducting research and collect-
ing data at a network level (see Easton 2010). Relative to the
importance of relational governance mechanisms at an inter-
personal and inter-organizational level, only a few studies
employ multiple levels of analysis (16%; e.g. Kamann et al.
2006; Zheng, Roehrich, and Lewis 2008, and very few studies
in OSM). Prior studies have furthermore mainly focused on
governance mechanisms in developed countries, with the
USA and UK accounting for over 50% of all published papers.
China is becoming increasingly interesting for governance
researchers with a current share of 9.5%. Although relatively
limited, the number of publications that use data across
countries has started to grow in recent years (<10%; see for
example Yang, Wacker, and Sheu 2012).
Second, there is evidence of a variation of governance
research methodologies in the published literature. Survey
research tends to be the primary data collection method
(42%). Surveys have particularly been dominant in studies into
the performance implications of contractual and relational
governance (e.g. Sumo et al. 2016). The use of case study
methodologies is more limited (15%). A few studies (4%)
adopt mixed-method designs, such as by combining question-
naires with interviews (notable examples are Blumberg 2001;
Gulati and Nickerson 2008) or conducting experiments (e.g.
Tangpong, Hung, and Ro 2010). Surprisingly, despite the long-
term nature of IORs and the importance to investigate
exchange governance over time, there is only limited evi-
dence of publications adopting a longitudinal or processual
research perspective (e.g. Roehrich and Caldwell 2012).
Third, certain theoretical perspectives seem to be fav-
oured in the analysis of exchange governance. In particular,
transaction cost economics (TCE) appears to be the domin-
ant theoretical frame of reference (e.g. Dyer 1997). Social
exchange and management control theories are other con-
ceptual lenses frequently adopted in extant literature (e.g.
Faems et al. 2008; Jap and Ganesan 2000). Given the com-
plexity of the phenomena under investigation, several stud-
ies adopt multiple theoretical perspectives to serve their
purposes (e.g. Mellewigt, Madhok, and Weibel 2007). For
example, extant research studies investigating the substitu-
tion and complementarity of relational and contractual gov-
ernance mechanisms combine TCE with theories of social
and relational exchange (e.g. Liu, Luo, and Liu 2009; Poppo
and Zenger 2002; Sumo et al. 2016).
Surprisingly, well-established theoretical perspectives such
as agency theory has not been much in focus, accounting
for only around 2% of investigated management papers (see
for instance Lazzarini, Miller, and Zenger 2004). Similarly,
%2<%1<
<2%
78%
<2% 16%
Level of analysis (%)
individual level inter-personal intra-firm
inter-firm: dyad inter-firm: network multi-level analysis
42%
15%
<1%
5%
3%
<1%
4%
4%
2%
22%
Methods adopted (%)
survey case study
qual interviews modeling
3%
16%
47%
19%
2% 3% 9%
Theorecal perspecves (%)
agency theory contact theory and control
TCE relaonal exchange theory/ governance/trust
relaonal contracng n/a
other theories
Figure 3. (a–c) Key characteristics of extant governance exchange research.
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other theories such as resource-based view and dynamic
capabilities perspectives appear to be under-utilised too.
More recently, the organizational information processing the-
ory (OIPT) has experienced a resurgence in inter-firm govern-
ance studies (e.g. Lumineau 2017). For example, studies have
found that contracts designed with an emphasis on control
functions would orient the need for processing information
pertaining to the monitoring of partners’ activities (Provan
and Skinner 1989). In contrast, contracts emphasising the
coordination function would facilitate the flow and exchange
of information between partners (Lumineau and Henderson
2012; Malhotra and Lumineau 2011; Reuer and Ari~no 2007).
Our review has produced a clearer picture of growing but
fragmented governance research. Based on the comprehen-
sive analysis of the dataset, we depict a multidimensional
framework of inter-organizational governance. Figure 4 sum-
marises key concepts (environment, relational and contractual
governance interplay as well as performance outcomes)
derived from our analysis. The arrows flowing from outcomes
back to governance mechanisms suggest that actual perform-
ance outcomes in IORs (e.g. opportunism or poor exchange or
relationship performance) may trigger adaptations in contrac-
tual and/or relational governance mechanisms (e.g. Selviaridis
and Spring 2018). This figure forms the basis for the synthesis
efforts presented in subsequent sections.
4. Part II: synthesis and emerging research themes
This section provides a critical reflection and synthesis of
inter-organizational governance research emerging from the
analysis part, paving the way for future research avenues.
4.1. Conceptualization and evolution of governance
mechanisms interplay
Inter-organizational governance mechanisms refer to the for-
mal and informal rules of exchange between partners (North
1990; Vandaele et al. 2007; Poppo and Zenger 2002).
Previous studies have distinguished between two types of
governance mechanisms regarding IORs: economic strategies
such as contracts, and relational governance which is derived
from trust and social norms (Griffith and Myers 2005;
Vandaele et al. 2007). Social norms are considered as behav-
ioural guidelines that enforce social obligation in the rela-
tionship (Caldwell, Roehrich, and George 2017; Cannon,
Achrol, and Gundlach 2000; Heide 1994). While in this paper
our focus is on formal contracts, we acknowledge that there
are several other definitions in the literature referring to
‘informal’ or ‘normative’ contracts, whose main characteristic
is that they are not written and legally enforceable. In add-
ition, the literature refers to relational contracts as a third
form of contracting between classical and neoclassical con-
tracting (Williamson 1985), which entails flexible and open-
ended contractual specifications and provisions to allow for
adaptation in relationships given the inherently incomplete
nature of formal contracts (see MacNeil 1980). Relational con-
tracts are a type of formal contracts in the sense that they
are written and legally enforceable, and therefore are within
the scope of our analysis.
While research on exchange governance has steadily
increased in recent years, our analysis also shows a lack of
common conceptualisation and operationalisation. The rela-
tionship between governance antecedents and governance
mechanisms has been a subject of debate in the literature
(Cao and Lumineau 2015; Poppo and Zenger 2002). Early
studies adopted a TCE perspective and tried to explore the
relationship between the transaction characteristics, for
example, uncertainty and asset specificity as well as contract
design (Schepker et al. 2014). While transactions character-
ized by lower uncertainty and asset specificity do not require
detailed contracts, partners design detailed contracts, with
safeguarding clauses while conducting uncertain, asset-spe-
cific transactions (Reuer and Ari~no 2007). Real options theory
provides an alternative perspective to the relationship
Relational Governance
• Social capital theory
• Social exchange theory
• Capability perspective
• Control and coordination 
functions
Contractual Governance
• TCE
• Agency theory
• Capability perspective
• Control and coordination 
functions
Outcomes
• Exchange/relationship 
performance
• Opportunistic behaviour
• Learning / joint problem 
solving 
• Overall satisfaction
Environment
• (Types of) Uncertainty
• Prior ties / 
relationship length
• Asset specificity
• Power-dependency 
structure 
• Legal/institutional 
framework
• Type of relationship / 
organisation
Complements           Substitutes
Governance Antecedents Governance Mechanisms Conceptualization Performance Implications
(Preclusion/Destruction)
Figure 4. A multidimensional framework of inter-organizational governance.
PRODUCTION PLANNING & CONTROL 5
between uncertainty and contract design. While the TCE per-
spective implies that detailed contracts should be designed
in the face of uncertainty, a real options perspective calls for
more flexible contracts (Chi 2000). This flexibility allows part-
ners to refrain from making irreversible investments.
Furthermore, since the transaction characteristics, as well as
familiarity between partners, change over time, flexible con-
tracts allow for modification in response to the changing
environment (Schepker et al. 2014).
Similarly, scholars have argued that the development of
trust and norms between organizations appear to be less
driven by the transaction characteristics and are more of a
function of idiosyncratic capabilities of organizations (Dyer
and Singh 1998; Madhok and Tallman 1998). Furthermore,
the relationship between contractual and relational govern-
ance mechanisms appears to be even more tenuous (e.g.
Cao and Lumineau 2015). Early studies focused on the issue
argued that contracts have a damaging effect on relational
governance. The core argument of this stream of literature
was that the use of detailed contracts signals a lack of trust,
which could damage the prospect of relational governance
(Ghoshal and Moran 1996; Heide and John 1992; Macaulay
1963). Furthermore, detailed contracts create an environment
of vigilance, preventing the development of trust through
the reduction of opportunities for a spontaneous display of
good intentions (Frey and Jegen 2001; Malhotra 2009).
Another stream of literature has argued that relational
norms, such as trust, make contracts redundant, as trust can
govern relationships by itself (Das and Teng 2001; Gulati
1995). In other words, in a relationship characterized by
long-term trust, organizations would choose to employ more
informal modes of governance (Gulati and Nickerson 2008).
Over time, with the conceptual work by Das and Teng
(1998) and the seminal study by Poppo and Zenger (2002),
scholars moved towards the argument that contractual and
relational governance mechanisms complement each other.
This means that contracts can enhance trust while trust, in
turn, can trigger ‘learning to contract’ effects whereby con-
tracting parties learn to jointly design more effective con-
tracts and to collaborate (Mayer and Argyres 2004). Contracts
aid in the development of trust through the reduction of
information asymmetry between both parties (Bastl et al.
2012; Liu, Luo, and Liu 2009). Moreover, as organizations
enter into long-term relationships, they become more famil-
iar with each other (Gulati 1995) and learn to specify more
detailed contracts (Poppo and Zenger 2002; Ryall and
Sampson 2009).
Although the debate of a substitution and complementary
logic is ongoing in the literature, more recent works have
provided some clarification on this divide (Cao and
Lumineau 2015; Howard et al. 2019; Lumineau 2017).
Scholars have drawn a distinction between the control and
coordination function of formal contracts and argued that
these two functions interplay differently with relational
modes of governance. The control function refers to safe-
guarding parties against potential opportunism, whereas the
coordination function emphasizes delineation of roles/
responsibilities, communication and information sharing and
joint problem solving (Kapsali, Roehrich, and Akhtar 2019;
Schepker et al. 2014). While the control function signals a
lack of trust and negatively influences goodwill trust, the
coordination function of contracts creates a common know-
ledge structure, which aids in the development of compe-
tence trust (Malhotra and Lumineau 2011; Weber and
Mayer 2011).
More recent studies on inter-organizational governance
have moved towards exploring contractual governance in
further detail. For example, the literature shifted its focus
towards exploring issues pertaining to contract design
(Bercovitz and Tyler 2014; Dean, Griffith, and Calantone 2016;
Ozmel et al. 2017), the content of the contract (Duplat and
Lumineau 2016; Schilke and Lumineau 2018) and the link
between contracting and a range of performance outcomes
such as supply chain alignment (Selviaridis and Spring 2018),
new product performance (Dean, Griffith, and Calantone
2016), exchange performance (Poppo and Zhou 2014) and
dispute resolution (Lumineau and Malhotra 2011).
Our comprehensive review led to the identification of key
concepts and mechanisms pertaining to inter-organizational
governance (see Figure 4). These concepts are presented in
Table 1 along with key gaps in our knowledge of these con-
cepts. In accordance with Lumineau and Oliveira (2018), we
framed these knowledge gaps around key ‘blind spots’ in
research on inter-organizational governance. The subsequent
sections explore key gaps in further detail, thus supporting
the development of fruitful future research avenues.
4.2. Advancing inter-organizational
governance research
The following sections position key knowledge gaps and
blind spots and discuss opportunities for future research
efforts to advance inter-organizational governance research.
The intention here is not to elaborate upon all blind spots
identified in Table 1, but rather to offer some more specific
insights and discussions with regard to future directions of
inter-organizational governance research, considering also
suitable theories and research designs.
4.2.1. Longitudinal, multi-level and dual-party research
perspectives
Taking into consideration the fact that relationships usually
consist of a large number of interfaces between individuals
and organizations (e.g. between individuals, teams and
organizations), we contend that they are not accurately rep-
resented as a single entity (focus on one party only), focus-
ing on one level of analysis only or in a static picture
(Lumineau and Oliveira 2018). There has been limited atten-
tion on a longitudinal understanding of how governance
mechanisms evolve over time in IORs (notable exemption is,
for instance, the study by Zheng, Roehrich, and Lewis 2008).
Parties in long-term IORs will periodically alter and adjust
governance mechanisms and accompanying safeguards,
when deemed necessary and depending on the relative
weight given to governance mechanisms at specific points in
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Table 1. Key concepts and knowledge gaps for inter-organizational governance research.
Key concept Exemplary key papers Key takeaways
Knowledge gaps/blind spots for
further research
Uncertainty Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar
(2006); Rindfleisch and Heide (1997);
Selviaridis (2016)
Behavioural and environmental sources
of uncertainty influence contract
design and the functionality of
contract vis-a-vis relational
governance mechanisms
 Future studies should consider
possible asymmetries between
parties with regards to the impact
of uncertainty.
 Future research needs to consider
the viewpoints of a variety of
different organizations across
different sectors and countries.
Moreover, changes of uncertainty
over time need to be considered.
Prior ties/relationship length Cao and Lumineau (2015); Reuer and
Ari~no (2007); Vanneste and
Puranam (2010)
Prior ties/exchange experience
influences the detail of contractual
agreements and the degree of
relational governance mechanisms;
prior ties /relationship length
moderates the interplay of
contractual and
relational governance
 Further research needs to consider
a more nuanced conceptualisation
of time and the length of the
relationship concerning governance
interplay. Most prior studies
conceptualised time linearly, but
following Ancona, Okhuysen, and
Perlow (2001), time could be
conceptualized in other ways. For
instance, time could be interpreted
differently by both parties in the
relationship (subjective time), it
could be conceptualised as
renewing or restarting after a
period of time (cyclical time), and it
could be used as a reference point
around which activities are
examined (event time).
 Prior studies offer limited insights
into the impact of prior ties and its
impact on the contracting process.
There is a limited understanding of
how the contracting process
unfolds over time. In other words,
future studies need to unpack how
contracts are initially created and
then enacted (Schilke and
Lumineau 2018).
 Impact on promise of future
business (shadow of the future) on
the use of contract provisions
needs to be explored (Schepker
et al. 2014).
Asset specificity Heide and John (1992);
Williamson (1985)
High levels of asset specificity lead to
reliance on contractual safeguards to
mitigate opportunism; Relational
norms can be necessary
complements to manage risks
related to asset specificity
 There is a paucity of studies
distinguishing between buyer and
supplier asset specificity and
exploring its influence on
governance mechanisms (Vandaele
et al. 2007).
 Future research needs to explore
possible asymmetries (e.g. power,
information, trust) between parties
in the relationship and the impact
of asset specificity to further
heighten these asymmetries.
Power-dependency structure Lusch and Brown (1996) Power-dependency structure in inter-
organizational relationships has an
impact on the choice of
governance mechanisms
 There is a paucity of literature
exploring how both organizations
in a relationship appropriate more
value through the negotiation of
favourable contracts. Most prior
research focuses on one
organization’s bargaining power on
the contract structure (Argyres and
Bercovitz 2015).
 Future studies should also uncover
how the interaction of power and
contracting may contribute to
achieve supply chain alignment
(Selviaridis and Spring 2018).
Legal/institutional framework Zhou and Poppo (2010) Institutional set up (e.g. legal
/regulatory framework) impacts on
the effectiveness of governance
 Further studies should explore the
possible influence of institutional,
legal and cultural contexts on the
(continued)
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Table 1. Continued.
Key concept Exemplary key papers Key takeaways
Knowledge gaps/blind spots for
further research
mechanisms as it influences how
contracts are enforced and which
behaviours are (socially) acceptable
relationship between governance
mechanisms and performance.
 Combining this macro unit of
analysis with the inter-
organizational level of analysis,
studies could address the blind
spot of focusing on a single level of
analysis (Lumineau and
Oliveira 2018).
Type of relationship/organization Cao and Lumineau (2015); Mayer and
Teece (2008)
Type of relationship (e.g. strategic
alliances, buyer-supplier
relationships; cross-border
exchanges) or organization (e.g.
public or private) influences the
effects of governance mechanisms
 Recent studies have called for more
research that explore the
differences between contracts with
varied functional purposes across
different organizational forms
(Ranganathan, Ghosh, and
Rosenkopf 2018).
 Partnering organizations with
different types of organizational
structures and objectives may have
different assumptions with regards
to governance mechanisms. Further
research is needed to explore these
possible asymmetries.
Relational and contractual governance
and their interplay
Cannon, Achrol, and Gundlach (2000);
Heide and John (1992); Klein-
Woolthuis, Hillebrand, and
Nooteboom (2005); Poppo and
Zenger (2002); Zhou and
Poppo (2010)
Both governance mechanisms are vital
in inter-organizational relationships;
the interplay of governance
mechanisms is reliant on different
antecedents; governance interplay
will have an impact on performance
 Future research needs to consider
different types of trust (e.g.
competence-based) and their
impact on governance
mechanisms interplay.
 Further research is required to also
understand the impact of different
types of contracts (and their
specificity) such as performance-
based contracts (Essig et al., 2016)
and their impact on governance
mechanisms interplay (e.g. Cao and
Lumineau 2015; Selviaridis, 2016).
 Limited research has so far
addressed the interplay of different
governance functions and possible
governance dysfunctions (e.g.
Howard et al. 2019) and their
development over time.
Exchange/relationship performance Cao and Lumineau (2015);
Liu, Luo, and Liu (2009)
Performance of the exchange and/or
partners in terms of quality, cost and
on time deliveries; Joint use of
governance mechanisms may
increase relationship performance
 Impact of governance mechanisms
(functions) interplay on
performance is poorly explored. A
particularly promising area is to
understand the role and impact of
contracting capabilities (e.g. Argyres
and Mayer 2007) on exchange
performance.
 The use of third parties in contract
design and its subsequent influence
on performance needs to be
understood (e.g. Duplat and
Lumineau 2016).
 Use of objective measures along
with quasi-objective and perceptual
measures (such as satisfaction) is
required (Gulati and
Nickerson 2008).
 Performance data consider often
only one party’s perception/
measurements, whereas both
parties’ perceptions/measurements
should be considered.
 Future research should examine the
performance impact of coordination
and adaptation functions of
contracts (e.g. Schepker et al. 2014)
Opportunistic behavior Cao and Lumineau (2015); Yang,
Wacker, and Sheu (2012);
Williamson (1985)
Self-interest seeking with guile; the
relative effects of individual/joint
governance mechanisms on
 Further research needs to explore
the effect of opportunism on
contract-performance link (e.g.
Schilke and Lumineau 2018).
(continued)
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time (Halldorsson and Skjøtt-Larsen 2006). For instance,
Selviaridis and Spring’s (2010) empirical study demonstrates
how parties shift their emphasis among the normative
frames of the ‘contract’, the ‘deal’ and the ‘relationship’
(Collins 1999) as critical events (e.g. buyer fail to pay the sup-
plier in time) in the relationship unfold. In cases of such
events, a reference to the ‘relationship’ may be more appro-
priate than contract enforcement when relationship continu-
ity and long-term financial benefits are sought over short-
term economic gains.
A longitudinal perspective allows capturing characteristics
of the exchange parties and the relationship at given points
in time and in this sense contributes to our understanding of
key antecedents of governance mechanisms (e.g. Das and
Teng 2002). In line with the call for OSM scholars for increas-
ing attention to a longitudinal view of exchange governance
mechanisms and their interplay (Cao and Lumineau 2015;
Zheng, Roehrich, and Lewis 2008), longitudinal field research
is deemed appropriate for collecting and analysing data on
exchange relationships context, characteristics and critical
events (Langley 1999; Pettigrew 1990). Such data help in
uncovering nuances in the deployment of trust and formal
controls and capturing changes associated with substitution
and/or complementarity effects. Moreover, a dual-party per-
spective is vital to move away from extrapolating from
observations of a single party in an IOR (Lumineau and
Oliveira 2018). Understanding the differences (and possible
asymmetries) between parties in a relationship is key to
future research exploring governance mechanisms interplay.
A study by Son, Kocabasoglu-Hillmer, and Roden (2016), for
example, revealed that dissonance in the buyer’s and suppli-
er’s perceptions of the visions and collective goals for the
relationship result in differential strategic and operational
performance outcomes for both parties. Adopting a dual per-
spective, therefore, becomes particularly important for OSM
scholars. Further research should also consider the impact of
various levels of analysis, including, but not limited to, indi-
vidual and team and their impact on governance mecha-
nisms. For instance, future research should explore how
various functions of governance mechanisms are enacted by
individuals or teams in an IOR, thereby refining the govern-
ance mechanisms interplay debate.
4.2.2. Theoretical lenses
Research on governance mechanisms is likely to benefit from
an expanded theoretical frame of reference and infusing in a
more systematic fashion theoretical lenses such as agency
theory and capability perspective.
Agency theory can help delineate the circumstances
under which the interplay and potential complementarity
effects between trust and contractual controls occur.
Contractual controls do not necessarily preclude the develop-
ment of trust. The issue is rather what types of control are
employed in exchange relationships (Str€atling, Wijbenga, and
Dietz 2012). As Das and Teng (1998) suggested, trust and
control can complement each other, but the degree to which
they do depends on the type (namely, goal setting, structural
specifications and cultural blending) and level of control.
Such controls are both formal and informal, where informal
controls closely associated with relational governance mech-
anisms. However, we need to understand better the effects
of different types of contractual controls on trust (Str€atling,
Wijbenga, and Dietz 2012). Agency theory is a theoretical
lens that may drive such research endeavours. In particular,
its distinction between outcome- and behaviour-based con-
tracts (Eisenhardt 1989) is theoretically useful in the sense
that it disentangles the effects of process/behaviour monitor-
ing from outcome controls and associated incentive systems.
Table 1. Continued.
Key concept Exemplary key papers Key takeaways
Knowledge gaps/blind spots for
further research
opportunism reduction depending
on exchange characteristics
 Future studies should also explore
how opportunistic behaviour
changes over time based on the
interplay of
governance mechanisms.
Learning/joint problem solving Lumineau and Malhotra (2011); Mayer
and Argyres (2004); Selviaridis and
Spring (2018); Vanneste and
Puranam (2010)
Exchange partners over time learn to
contract and to collaborate to solve
problems or to (re)align their goals
and incentives as exchange- and
partner-specific knowledge
accumulates and is also reflected in
modified contracts
 Further work is needed on how
contract framing, in interaction with
other contract design and
management attributes, impacts on
buyer-supplier relationships and
how contracting parties might learn
to frame contracts effectively (e.g.
Selviaridis and van der Valk 2019).
 Future research should also
examine the way frames are
interpreted in relation to the
dynamics of trust and learning (e.g.
Weber 2017).
 Future work should also consider
the possible asymmetry (between
buyer and supplier) in ‘learning to
contract/collaborate’ effects in inter-
organizational relationships.
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As the review demonstrated, the existing governance lit-
erature appears to largely sidestep how organizations can
develop competence in managing formal contracts and lev-
eraging trust, social capital and related relational governance
mechanisms (Mayer and Argyres 2004). Indeed, literature
within organization studies and strategic management has
stressed the importance of contracting and relational capa-
bilities for performance attainment (Kreye, Roehrich, and
Lewis 2015). For instance, Argyres and Mayer (2007) and
Lumineau and Henderson (2012) argue that contract design
capabilities might be a source of competitive advantage for
organizations. These capabilities entail learning about the
required level of extensiveness and sophistication of contrac-
tual provisions in response to exchange attributes as well as
potential contingencies and hazards. Some existing studies
stress the notion of contracting capabilities which extend
beyond contract design to include know-how regarding the
outsourcing decision, contract monitoring and management
(Yang, Hsieh, and Li 2009). In the same vein, developing
appropriated organizational structures and processes to
articulate, codify and share expertise regarding the manage-
ment of relations with exchange partners can help improve
performance (Kale, Dyer, and Singh 2002; Kale and Singh
2007; Lorenzoni and Lipparini 1999). Future empirical
research on exchange governance should extend prior stud-
ies to examine how governance capabilities develop and
how they impact performance. Particularly for OSM scholars,
studying long-term buyer-supplier relationships, learning the-
ory could provide a useful lens to aid the understanding of
how buyers and suppliers develop the capability to design,
use and renegotiate the contracts overtime (Cao and
Lumineau 2015). Future research could also examine how
asymmetries in counterparts’ contracting and relational capa-
bilities impact on firm and relationship performance (see
Table 1).
4.2.3. The manifold facets of trust
Despite a myriad of trust definitions in extant management
literature, the concept is often positioned including two key
elements: positive expectations regarding the actions and/or
intentions of partners and voluntary vulnerability towards a
partner (Rousseau et al. 1998). Whilst some research studies
have distinguished between various types of trust, such as
intentional and competence trust (e.g. Klein-Woolthuis,
Hillebrand, and Nooteboom 2005), limited research has been
undertaken regarding the distinct levels of inter-personal
and inter-organizational trust and their interplay with con-
tractual governance mechanisms. A fundamental advantage
of conceptualising trust in these two dimensions is that by
taking this perspective, the inherently individual level of the
phenomenon can be extended to the organizational level of
analysis. That is, previous studies on the relationship
between both governance mechanisms deployed an over-
arching and rather general concept of trust, thereby failing
to distinguish between different types and dimensions inher-
ent in IORs. Inter-personal trust is referred to as ‘the extent
of a boundary-spanning agent’s trust in her counterpart in
the partner organi[s]ation’ (Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone
1998, 142). Moreover, in an exchange relationship, the role
of boundary-spanning individuals, as they build up strong
inter-personal ties, has an important influence on IORs.
Boundary-spanning individuals belonging to an organization
are characterized by having a higher involvement and inter-
action in the IOR than their counterparts (Friedman and
Podolny 1992). Trust is built among such individuals from
the contracting organizations and is based upon close inter-
actions and personal ties (Kale, Singh, and Perlmutter 2000).
Trust may also exist between organizations at the inter-
organizational level which has been defined as ‘the extent of
trust placed in the partner organi[s]ation by the members of
a focal organi[s]ation’ (Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone 1998,
142). This form of trust reflects an organization’s expectations
that the partner organization will not act opportunistically
(Bradach and Eccles 1989). One premise of inter-organiza-
tional trust exists where there is predictability of the partner-
ing organization’s behaviour towards a vulnerable focal
organization and this helps to develop greater confidence in
the relationship (Gulati and Nickerson 2008).
Apart from the level of trust, different types of trust
should be taken into consideration, moving away from offer-
ing a unified trust dimension and neglecting the multi-
faceted concept under investigation. The concept of trust is
closely related to social capital theory. In this context, Tsai
and Ghoshal (1998) have found that the cognitive and struc-
tural dimensions of social capital impact on trust, which rep-
resents an important aspect of the relational dimension of
social capital. Similarly, the seminal work by Sako (1992) dis-
tinguishes between various degrees of predictability in
behaviour, thus leading to three types of trust: goodwill,
competence and contractual. Building on this, Malhotra and
Lumineau (2011) suggest that while control provisions
included in formal contracts reduce goodwill trust,
the coordination function supports the development of
competence trust and increases the likelihood of resolving
inter-firm conflicts quickly. For example, the type of trust
developed over time could inform the level of contractual
completeness (Poppo and Zenger 2002). For OSM scholars,
studying the evolution of trust (e.g. from contractual to com-
petence to goodwill) and its ensuing effect on performance
represents a critical area of research. For instance, shadows
of the past and future may help recover trust breakdowns
and ensures continuity of buyer-supplier relationship (Poppo,
Zhou, and Ryu 2008; Wang, Craighead, and Li 2014). This
calls for further research to address this knowledge gap and
advance our understanding of the role and impact of inter-
personal and inter-organizational trust on contractual gov-
ernance mechanisms.
4.2.4. Relationship environment and governance
antecedents
Our analysis and synthesis resulted in adding environmental
dimensions influencing the use of exchange governance
mechanisms (see Figure 4), such as asset specificity and the
creation of associated partner-specific dependencies (e.g.
Cannon, Achrol, and Gundlach 2000; Vandaele et al. 2007);
the role of power asymmetry (e.g. Bucklin and Sengupta
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1993) and power/dependence (see Lusch and Brown 1996)
in relation to governance choices and conflict resolution
(Malhotra and Lumineau 2011); the wider institutional envir-
onment and legal system in which contracting parties oper-
ate (e.g. Deakin, Lane, and Wilkinson 1997) and the type of
industry, sector and relationship (e.g. public-private partner-
ships; Zheng, Roehrich, and Lewis 2008).
Two of these antecedents seem particularly fruitful areas
for further enquiry: uncertainty and prior ties. Table 1 identi-
fies some specific blind spots and opportunities for future
research in relation to these two antecedents. Uncertainty
and its various types (environmental, market and behav-
ioural; see Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 2006) feature
strongly in the governance literature as key antecedents to
governance choice. For instance, Podonly (1994) finds that
high market uncertainty results in organizations engaging in
exchanges with those of similar status and with whom they
have transacted in the past. Social norms are predominant in
such instances. In a similar vein, Carson, Madhok, and Wu
(2006) refine the uncertainty concept and distinguish
between volatility and ambiguity as antecedents of the
deployment of relational contracts; in particular, relational
contracts appear to be robust to environmental volatility but
not to ambiguity, whereas formal contracts perform better in
cases of highly ambiguous, but less volatile, transaction envi-
ronments (Carson, Madhok, and Wu 2006). The existing lit-
erature often stresses the effect of particularly environmental
and behavioural uncertainty, but such a focus underplays the
role of risk attitudes of buyers and suppliers in contract
design (Eisenhardt 1989). In addition to future research
opportunities identified in Table 1, we suggest that agency
theory could be useful to uncover the role of risk attitudes
of exchange partners in designing contractual governance
mechanisms. Attitudes towards risk may result from internal
(firm-level) factors such as organizational culture and mind-
sets of individual (senior) managers, rather than external
(environmental) factors. An agency theory framework allows
studying the impact on risk aversion and/or risk-taking
behaviour on exchange governance.
Scholars from different fields recognize the importance of
repeated exchanges in IORs. Economists emphasize the cal-
culative nature of relational governance in the present when
expectations of future exchanges prompt current cooper-
ation (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 2002). That is, in contrast
to sociologists who consider the ‘trustworthy status’ as con-
ditional upon the benefits derived from the trustworthy sta-
tus (e.g. repeated business) over the status of self-interest
(Klein 1996). This logic is common to game theory, where
opportunistic behaviour in the present is contrasted with the
benefits of cooperative behaviour in the future. On the other
hand, the sociological perspective emphasizes the import-
ance of prior exchanges in forming social norms and ties
that emerge in subsequent exchanges (Uzzi 1997). While we
concur with existing research that the history of IORs can
have a bearing on the development of governance mecha-
nisms, we argue that there need to be more systematic
efforts to employ a longitudinal perspective to study the role
of prior ties in exchange governance (see also Cao and
Lumineau 2015; Selviaridis and Spring 2018). This is because
a longitudinal view emphasizes agency (i.e. what individuals/
organizations do), temporal interconnectedness and the
sequence of critical events which describes how things
change over time (Pettigrew 1997; Van de Ven 1992).
Studying exchanges as continuous processes and employing
micro-level analysis of actors (both firms and managers
within these firms) and events during the exchange
(Pettigrew 1997) help in better understanding the role of
prior interactions and how they influence the interplay of
trust and formal controls (e.g. Huemer, Bostr€om, and
Felzensztein 2009; Zheng, Roehrich, and Lewis 2008). This is
important if governance scholars wish to capture the co-evo-
lution of trust and contracts over repeated exchanges
(Faems et al. 2008; Vanneste and Puranam 2010). Table 1
suggests specific avenues for future research in relation to
the above aspects.
In addition to the antecedents mentioned above, OSM
scholars have called for exploration of the role of power-
dependence in the relationship and its impact on the inclu-
sion or exclusion of different types of contract clauses
(Selviaridis 2016; Selviaridis and Spring 2018). Particularly, the
bargaining power afforded to the buyer or supplier through
its position in the wider supply chain/network could signifi-
cantly shape the contract (Argyres and Bercovitz 2015). This
further links to the call for more research on the overall
structure of a multi-tier supply network and its influence on
governance mechanisms (Mena, Humphries, and Choi 2013;
Zhang, Lawrence, and Anderson 2015). For instance, a
closed-type structure of supply network leads to tighter self-
enforcing agreements and stronger informal social controls
(Mena, Humphries, and Choi 2013).
4.2.5. Outcomes
Recent prior literature established that contractual and rela-
tional governance mechanisms act as complements (Poppo
and Zenger 2002; Cao and Lumineau 2015). Thus, there is an
increasing emphasis on exploring the performance implica-
tions of the governance interplay. Prior work focused on
issues such as reducing opportunism (Mellewigt, Madhok,
and Weibel 2007; Zhou and Xu 2012), buyer’s satisfaction
(Poppo and Zenger 2002), relationship performance (Zaheer,
McEvily, and Perrone 1998), facilitating joint problem solving
(Mayer and Argyres, 2004) and information flow (Olsen et al.
2005). More recent studies have begun to widen their scope
in terms of examining performance outcomes such as
improving project performance (Cani€els, Gelderman, and
Vermeulen 2012; Ning 2017), innovation performance (Arranz
and de Arroyabe 2012; Carey, Lawson, and Krause 2011),
negotiation strategy (Lumineau and Henderson 2012), plant
performance (Wacker, Yang, and Sheu 2016), firm perform-
ance (Jayaraman et al. 2013) and alliance performance
(Schilke and Lumineau 2018).
Studies exploring the link between governance and per-
formance have generally adopted perceptual measures and
conceptualized it as the buyer’s satisfaction with the
exchange (for example, Poppo and Zenger 2002). This is
because exchange performance is harder to specify and
PRODUCTION PLANNING & CONTROL 11
therefore data are difficult to obtain (Poppo and Zhou 2014).
Some exceptions include Gulati and Nickerson (2008) who
combine perceptual measures with quasi-objective measures
such as average part target ratio, average part price change
ratio, average defect rate and improvements in average
defect rate. However, most of the studies adopting more
objective measures such as cost, quality and delivery con-
sider mainly the buyer’s perception of supplier performance
(Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone 1998). Since OSM scholars
have also traditionally relied on perceptual measures of per-
formance (Ketokivi and Schroeder 2004), considering more
objective measures of performance would be a particularly
fruitful future research avenue.
In what follows, we focus on the two outcomes that
appear in the majority of studies (over 75%): exchange per-
formance and opportunism. Table 1 identifies a number of
specific suggestions for future research in these areas. Prior
literature offers a mixed view with regard to the impact of
governance mechanisms on exchange performance. For
instance, Lusch and Brown (1996) have drawn a distinction
between normative and explicit contracts, suggesting that
normative contracts can positively influence relational behav-
iour (e.g. flexibility and solidarity) and lead to better per-
formance. Lee and Cavusgil (2006) argue for the positive
impact of trust on the stability of alliances as well as on
effective knowledge transfer. Ferguson, Paulin, and Bergeron
(2005) found that norms of cooperation and trust predomin-
ate over contractual mechanisms in terms of how clients
evaluate exchange performance. These and other govern-
ance studies to date mostly stress the safeguarding role of
contracts and their impact in terms of opportunism reduc-
tion. Relatively little is known about the performance effects
of coordination and adaptation contract functions (e.g. what
contract clauses promoting coordination and adaptation are
included in formal contracts and how do they impact
exchange performance). Further research is needed to
understand better the performance implications of coordin-
ation and adaptation-oriented formal contracts (Schepker
et al. 2014; see Table 1).
In relation to the above, we also need a better under-
standing of the impact of contracting capabilities on
exchange performance (see Table 1), as well as what types
of contracting capabilities are particularly effective in devel-
oping the coordination and adaptation functions of contracts
(Selviaridis 2016; Spring and Araujo 2014). A capability per
spective to contracting has been stressed in some prior stud-
ies (e.g. Argyres and Mayers 2007; Lumineau, Frechet, and
Puthod 2011), but there is still limited evidence of whether
‘learning to contract’ effects performance and how the devel-
opment of contracting capabilities impacts performance.
Future research should adopt a longitudinal and dyadic per-
spective using dynamic capabilities theory to capture learn-
ing effects (Schepker et al. 2014) and their impacts in terms
of incentive alignment and performance improvement in
supply chains. For instance, studies could examine the pro-
cess of how organizations learn to contract and more specif-
ically, learn to control and coordinate in different contexts.
Longitudinal, in-depth case studies are particularly useful in
this endeavour in that they enable gaining access to rich
sources of data such as evolution of contract documents
(Mayer and Argyres 2004).
Opportunistic behaviour is determined by a wide spec-
trum of factors pertaining to economic incentives (e.g. asym-
metric investments specific to the exchange and unequal
distribution of benefits), cultural diversity and goal incom-
patibility as well as short alliance horizons and pressures for
immediate performance results (Das and Rahman 2010;
Lumineau 2017). Extant literature focuses on how different
governance mechanisms (e.g. formal and informal controls)
can be employed to mitigate opportunism and its different
facets. For instance, Carson, Madhok, and Wu (2006) stated
that relational contracts reduce opportunism in cases of high
volatility, but they are not sufficient in cases of high ambigu-
ity, where formal contracts are found to be more robust.
Lumineau and Quelin (2012) suggest that different contract
function emphasis (in terms of control and coordination pro-
visions) are required to encounter strong and weak forms of
opportunism. Such analysis also suggests that some mecha-
nisms are more effective than others taking into account the
relationship context and specific environmental conditions
such as the sector, type of transaction and level of environ-
mental uncertainty (Rivera-Santos and Rufin 2010; Rindfleisch
et al. 2010).
Future research should, therefore, improve our under-
standing of the determinants and drivers of governance
mechanism decisions ex-ante, with the aim of deterring
opportunistic behaviours ex-post and agency theory may be
helpful here. Neumann (2010), for instance, submits that
appropriability concerns, information asymmetry and bar-
gaining power asymmetries instigate the deployment of
detailed contracts ex-ante, which are then complemented by
trust mechanisms. Given its focus on the determinants of
contract choices other than asset specificity (e.g. task pro-
grammability and risk attitude of buyer/supplier), agency the-
ory is promising for explaining the effects of contractual
governance mechanisms in IORs. In addition, future research
should seek to explore the effect of opportunism on the con-
tractual governance-performance link, as well as how oppor-
tunistic behaviour may evolve over time depending on the
dynamic interplay of contracts and relational governance
(see Table 1).
An additional outcome that has been highlighted in the
literature more recently is learning and joint problem solving
between contracting parties, and the interplay of learning
and governance mechanisms (e.g. Mayer and Argyres 2004).
A particularly interesting aspect stressed in the literature is
the role of contract framing (Weber and Mayer 2011) and its
connection to learning effects in IORs (Weber 2017). Future
research should consider potential asymmetries between a
buyer and a supplier in terms of learning effects. In addition,
further research is needed to uncover how contracting par-
ties learn to frame contractual provisions and how interpre-
tations of (revisited) contract frames may impact the
dynamics of trust and learning in inter-firm relationships (see
Table 1).
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4.3. Limitations and further research
This study has its limitations, some of which will serve as a
stimulus for future work. First, this study’s focus was to ana-
lyse and synthesise prior research into a multi-dimensional
framework, not offering detailed theoretical propositions or
hypotheses, which may be seen as the next step. Second,
this review mainly deployed the ISI Web of Knowledge data-
base. While aiming for comprehensive coverage by following
rigorous, comprehensive review and synthesis procedures,
the database selection and filtering processes may have
omitted some relevant research such as conference papers.
However, we remain confident that our comprehensive
review has covered a wide range of management journal
articles on the topic. Furthermore, even though only peer-
reviewed articles were selected in the dataset, we cannot
rule out the fact that quality levels of selected articles are
the same. Future studies could improve upon these limita-
tions by complimenting this comprehensive literature review
with an assessment of the reliability and validity of results by
focusing on management journals of similar standing
(Hawker et al. 2002).
Third, deploying an analytical framework for such a multi-
dimensional concept of exchange governance highlights
some previously under-researched linkages while failing to
capture others. Foremost, however, we feel the analytical
framework helped to bound and integrate the various, dis-
persed research streams. We also acknowledge the caveat
that our comprehensive review explicitly focuses on inter-
organizational governance and its two core mechanisms, i.e.
contractual and relational governance. Future studies should
extend this work by reviewing the literature on governance
more broadly, for example, network governance (Provan,
Fish, and Sydow 2007; Provan and Kenis 2007) and structural
decisions for governing transactions. As such, we hope the
research agenda that we set will help advance the current
body of knowledge on inter-organizational governance
mechanisms in general and within the OSM research field
in particular.
Due to the paucity of studies exploring governance, our
comprehensive review has focused on the governance of
IORs at the dyadic level. Our findings, however, point toward
future research directions that are relevant for the govern-
ance of inter-organizational networks. Particularly, the gov-
ernance of network-level relationships is fundamentally
different from that of dyadic relationships. Das and Teng
(2002), for example, adopting a social exchange theoretic
lens, distinguished the governance of network-level, multi-
party relationship from dyadic relationships. Dyadic relation-
ships rely on restricted social exchanges, where the two par-
ties have direct reciprocity with each other. In contrast,
network relationships rely on generalized social exchanges,
where the obligations to one party could be transferred to
another party in the network. Therefore, network transactions
are governed through indirect reciprocity, where the mem-
bers repay the favour gained from one member to a differ-
ent member of the network. The importance of relational
governance, as well, as coordination in network relationships
is even more pronounced because it is challenging to design
explicit contracts to govern networks (Li et al. 2012; Oliveira
and Lumineau 2017). Such issues make the governance of
inter-organizational networks fundamentally different from
that of dyadic relationships and therefore warrant more
detailed attention in future studies.
5. Conclusion
The paper advances our understanding regarding the con-
ceptualisation and operationalisation of governance mecha-
nisms in IORs. A myriad of papers draws on the notion of
governance mechanisms to illustrate and explain various
aspects of relationships. This research effort is timely, taking
stock of this important and frequently used concept of gov-
ernance mechanisms, and assessing whether a coherent
body of knowledge has developed. In reviewing and synthe-
sising extant literature studies, we provided one of the first
comprehensive attempts to clarify exchange governance
conceptualisation and operationalisation across management
disciplines, including OSM studies. We position a comprehen-
sive conceptual framework as a more coherent means of fur-
ther developing the research agenda for the governance
of IORs.
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